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DON’T GO IT ALONE: INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL PROJECT PARTICIPATION 
BY SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED ENTERPRISES 
 
Abstract 
Recent years have seen a rapid increase in SMEs working collaboratively in inter-
organizational projects. But what drives the emergence of such projects, and what types of 
industries breed them the most? To address these questions, this paper extends the long 
running literature on the firm and industry antecedents of new venturing and alliance 
formation to the domain of project-based organization by SMEs. Based on survey data 
collected among 1,725 small and medium sized organizations and longitudinal industry data, 
we find an overall pattern that indicates that IOPV participation is primarily determined by a 
focal SME’s scope of innovative activities, and the munificence, dynamism and complexity 
of its environment. Unexpectedly, these variables have different effects on whether SMEs are 
likely to engage in IOPVs, compared to with how many there are in their portfolio at a time. 
Implications for theory development are discussed. 
 
Introduction 
Project work today increasingly requires the flexible and temporary involvement of external 
partners (e.g. Bakker et al., 2011; Clegg et al., 2002; Maurer, 2010). By pooling the expertise 
and resources of multiple organizations for the execution of project tasks, such inter-
organizational project ventures (IOPVs)  have been proposed to be excellent vehicles to, 
amongst others, achieve economies of scale, come up with innovative products, learn, and 
hedge risks (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008; Kenis et al., 2009). IOPVs are often defined as 
temporary systems of functionally interdependent but legally autonomous organizations that 
cooperate to complete pre-defined project tasks in an ex ante (contractually) defined limited 
amount of time (Jones et al., 1998; Sydow & Staber, 2002). When the project is completed, 
the system disbands (DeFillippi & Arthur, 1998; Schwab & Miner, 2008).  
Despite the host of attention to project-based forms of organization, we know 
relatively little of why organizations are increasingly engaging in IOPVs (Söderlund, 2004). 
What we do know is primarily based on anecdotal and case study evidence, which was a 
natural first step for researchers interested in starting to answer this question (Bakker, 2010). 
The present paper attempts to bring systematic large sample data to bear on the question of 
where inter-organizational project ventures come from. More specifically, we draw on the 
long line of literature on the relative effects of firm and industry level characteristics on new 
venturing and alliance formation (e.g. Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Gulati, 1999; Stuart, 
1998) and that on project-based organization (e.g. Schwab & Miner, 2008; Sydow et al., 
2004) to study the effects of specific organizational and industry variables that drive 
organizations to participate in IOPVs. We do so in the context of a particular kind of 
organizations; small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). While we, therefore, cannot be 
certain that our findings equally apply to larger organizations, we chose to do so because of a 
gap in the project literature, which has thus far had a primary focus on projects engaged in by 
large organizations despite the fact that particularly for SMEs, projects are a crucial driver of 
revenue (Turner et al., 2009). Therefore, based on an empirical analysis of data collected 
among 1,725 SMEs and the industries in which they are embedded, we aim to answer the 
following research question: which organizational and industry level antecedents determine 
SME participation in inter-organizational project ventures?  
 
Inter-Organizational Projects as a Form of Organization 
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IOPVs are characterized by two under-researched features that, especially in combination, set 
them apart from other types of inter-firm collaboration and make them a highly interesting 
research phenomenon. 
First, unlike many stable collaborative relations which are open-ended in nature (such 
as most social relations and informal organizational ties), IOPVs are explicitly temporary. 
This “temporariness” means that there is an explicit and ex ante defined limited time of 
interaction between the collaborating partners after which the venture is disbanded (Grabher, 
2002; Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008); essentially, they are “built to fall apart” (cf. Greve et al., 
2010). It has been proposed that knowing up front that a collaboration will be temporary has 
important effects on intra-project dynamics (Saunders & Ahuja, 2006). For example, 
temporariness reduces a collaboration’s shadow of the future, i.e. the length of time two 
parties expect to collaborate (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). On the one hand, available 
research suggests that shorter shadows of the future prevent stable collaboration to emerge 
because it raises opportunities for opportunism, knowing that other parties will not have an 
opportunity to reciprocate or retaliate later (Heide & Miner, 1992). On the other hand, it has 
been proposed that the temporary nature of IOPVs provides flexibility, i.e. the possibility for 
organizations to quickly and easily alternate between different projects and partners by 
shutting down some and starting others (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008; Schwab & Miner, 
2008). 
Second, unlike in-house projects (Söderlund, 2004), or strategic alliances that are 
usually dyadic (Lavie et al., 2007), IOPVs often include multiple partners, i.e. more than two 
collaborating organizations (Bakker et al., 2011). The literature on multi-partner alliances and 
consortia (e.g. Das & Teng, 2002; Lavie et al., 2007) proposes that the dynamics involved in 
collaborations of three or more legally independent parties are fundamentally different from 
those found in dyadic relation between just two. Das & Teng (2002), for instance, suggest 
that in multi-partner collaborations social exchange is generalized rather than direct, relying 
on generalized (rather than direct) reciprocity, and social sanctions and macro cultures (rather 
than formal contracts) in order to be successfully managed. Lavie et al. (2007) propose that 
the multilateral nature of collaboration in multi-partner collaborations asks for more complex 
governance, and that in contrast to dyadic collaborations, parties in such collaborations are 
more likely to receive different returns from participation. These two dimensions of IOPVs 
(“temporariness” and “multi-partnerness”) set IOPVs apart from other types of inter-firm 
collaboration such as strategic alliances, but are organizational dimensions that are ill 
understood thus far.  
 
Hypotheses 
To explain IOPV participation by SMEs, there are two likely streams of theories that 
can be drawn upon; those that highlight firm characteristics (e.g. strategic choice and the 
resource based view) and those that stress the role of the industry (e.g. population ecology 
theory and industrial economics, see Short et al., 2009). We discuss the likely variables that 
explain IOPV participation on both these levels below. We thereby extend the literature on 
firm and industry antecedents of alliance formation to the domain of project-based 
organization, and draw on both the alliance formation and project-based organization 
literatures to formulate hypotheses. 
 
Firm-level Factors impacting Inter-Firm Project Venture Participation by SMEs 
On the level of firm characteristics, prior research on new venturing and alliance 
formation has centered on the importance of strategic resources and firm-specific 
uncertainty. With regard to the former, Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven (1996: 138) have stated 
that “resources provide both the need and the opportunities for alliance formation”. Inter-
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organizational collaborations, such as IOPVs, are seen as ways to gain access to resources 
(Teng, 2007). The most important resources are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and non-
substitutable, and valuable resources that adhere to these criteria (like knowledge) generally 
need an organizational vehicle like an inter-organizational collaborative structure in order to 
be successfully transferred (Sakakibara, 2002). From this logic, important drivers of inter-
firm collaboration are resource search behaviour, induced by firms having a resource 
intensive innovative strategy, and resource surpluses, which can help to find and attract 
partners (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). 
Scope of Innovative Activities. Firms innovate in an effort to strengthen or maintain 
their competitive position. We expect that SMEs with a broader scope of innovative activity, 
which means they engage in different types of innovation, are more likely to encounter the 
boundaries of their internal knowledge base (Teng, 2007), as by nature different innovative 
activities draw more heavily on internal firm resources (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). 
IOPVs specifically seem excellent organizational devices to cross the boundaries of a firm’s 
knowledge base, especially as they relate to innovation. As mentioned, IOPVs are 
characterized by being temporary and multi-party. The temporary nature of inter-firm 
projects grants SMEs with flexible and pointed access to resources held by other 
organizations (Duysters & De Man, 2003). Moreover, being temporary breeds a strong task 
focus and a break from normal routines, and prevents lock-in effects of partners working 
together over extended periods of time that can stifle innovation (Grabher, 2002; Skilton & 
Dooley, 2010). The temporariness of IOPVs thus grants a possibility of flexible and low-cost 
experimentation with new designs which promotes “excellent preconditions for creating new 
knowledge” (Sydow et al., 2004: 1481). IOPVs thus seem excellent ways for participating 
SMEs to access, internalize, and co-develop critical innovative resources that are unlikely to 
be held internally by a single SME. We, therefore, expect that SMEs with a broader spectrum 
of innovative activities are more likely to participate in IOPVs than SMEs with a narrower 
(or no) spectrum of innovative activity. Hypothesis 1 follows from this: 
Hypothesis 1: SMEs with a broader scope of innovative activities are more 
likely to participate in inter-organizational project ventures. 
 
Size of the Human Resource Base. Human resources need to be allocated to projects 
by the organizations that found them (Engwall, 2003). All things being equal, we expect 
IOPVs to have a higher likelihood of being founded by larger SMEs, as larger SMEs tend to 
have a larger pool of human capital with a wider variety of qualities that can be allocated to 
the project. From the focal organization’s point of view, SMEs with larger resource pools 
likely have more freedom to experiment and allocate people to different kinds of projects 
than SMEs in which the human resource base is smaller (Cyert & March, 1963). Moreover, 
organizations with larger human resource pools tend to have more experienced management 
(Kogut & Zander, 1992). Therefore, SMEs with larger human resource bases are likely able 
to manage larger and more complex portfolios of IOPVs, which by virtue of their inclusion of 
multiple partners by themselves already require more complex governance structures than 
dyadic collaborations (Lavie et al., 2007). We, therefore, expect that:   
Hypothesis 2: SMEs with a larger human resource base are more likely to 
participate in inter-organizational project ventures. 
 
Efficiency of the Human Resource Base. It is not only how many people an SME 
employs that is important, it is also important to consider what they do. Therefore, the 
efficiency of the human resource base is a third organizational factor that we take into 
account. Efficiency of the human resource base pertains to labour productivity, i.e. the 
economic value that is produced per employee of the SME. In general, one would expect that 
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SMEs with a more efficient human resource base are better skilled at managing the 
deployment of human resources (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003). This ability is in turn likely to 
make such SMEs attractive project partners, and we expect them to be better able to manage 
complex inter-firm projects than SMEs with a less efficient deployment of human resources. 
Based on the above, we expect both from the focal SME’s point of view as well as 
from the point of view of potential project partners that SMEs with a more efficient human 
resource base are more likely to engage in IOPVs than SMEs with a less efficient human 
resource base. Hypothesis 3 follows: 
Hypothesis 3: SMEs with a more efficient human resource base are more 
likely to participate in inter-organizational project ventures. 
 
Perceived Firm-Specific Uncertainty. Whereas resources can provide SMEs with 
opportunities to start or participate in IOPVs, uncertainty creates the conditions in which 
these opportunities can be leveraged (Koka et al., 2006). In the 1970s, increases in 
environmental uncertainty in the U.S. airline industry led to changes in organizational 
strategies from pricing strategies, the opening of new hubs, and changes in flight routes 
(Koka et al., 2006: 724; Lang & Lockhart, 1990). Therefore, uncertainty is, as mentioned, a 
fourth important predictor of IOPV participation.  
Organizations strive to reduce uncertainty by various structural arrangements, 
including inter-organizational collaboration (Beckman et al., 2004; Thompson, 1967). Inter-
organizational collaboration can be an effective way to cope with uncertainty because it 
provides an opportunity to get access to otherwise external resources and share risks over 
multiple firms (Sakakiba, 2002; Teng, 2007). In this way, uncertainty creates the conditions 
for resources to be leveraged through inter-organizational collaborations. Extant literature has 
suggested distinguishing between two types of uncertainty: firm-specific uncertainty, i.e. the 
amount of uncertainty experienced by an individual organization, and uncertainty at the level 
of the industry (commonly referred to as market uncertainty), i.e. external uncertainty shared 
across a set of organizations (Beckman et al., 2004). 
There are several reasons why IOPVs might be suitable reducers of firm-specific 
uncertainty for SMEs. One is that they provide SMEs with access to diverse knowledge and 
resources hosted with multiple partners (Whitley, 2006), while by virtue of being temporary 
not demanding long-term resource commitments or fixed costs (Duysters & De Man, 2003). 
In other words, they allow for low-cost experimentation and partnering flexibility (Schwab & 
Miner, 2008), in which “companies [..] may launch a variety of ventures [..] and may 
terminate unsuccessful ventures at low cost and little disturbance to the organizational 
sponsor” (Sydow et al., 2004: 1475). Moreover, they allow the SME to acquire knowledge 
swiftly, thereby helping it to deal quickly with its internal uncertainty (Duysters & De Man, 
2003; Hobday, 2000). As Jones & Lichtenstein (2008) mention, SMEs that experience 
internal uncertainty need decoupling, which allows to flexibly initiate, reconfigure, or shut 
down activities. IOPVs, more so than in-house projects, provide this flexibility because 
resource bundles can be rented or exchanged rather than owned, and “can be reallocated 
cheaply and quickly to meet changing environmental demands” (Jones et al., 1997: 919), 
which lowers firm-specific uncertainty.  
Based on the above, we expect the level of firm-specific uncertainty experienced by a 
focal SME to be positively related to IOPV participation. Hypothesis 4 follows: 
Hypothesis 4: SMEs experiencing higher levels of firm-specific uncertainty are 
more likely to participate in inter-organizational project ventures. 
 
 
Industry-level Factors impacting Inter-Firm Project Venture Participation by SMEs 
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 As mentioned, the literature on the relative effects of firm and industry on new 
venturing and alliance formation has made a forceful claim that not only organizations, but 
also the specific industries in which organizations are embedded have profound effects on 
organizations’ proclivity to participate in inter-firm collaborations (e.g. Stuart, 1998). As 
mentioned, perhaps one of the most elementary features of this wider context concerns the 
degree of market uncertainty in the specific industry in which the SMEs that participate in the 
project are embedded. 
 
Market Uncertainty. Because, as mentioned, IOPVs seem to be particularly effective 
vehicles to reduce uncertainty, we expect uncertainty at the industry level (market 
uncertainty) to be positively related to IOPV participation rates. There are several arguments 
that suggest that IOPV participation might be related to market uncertainty. First, IOPVs are 
temporary, and therefore quick and flexible (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008; Schwab & Miner, 
2008) by which they grant the project partners swift access to knowledge and information so 
they can adapt quickly to rapidly changing (i.e. uncertain) circumstances (Duysters & De 
Man, 2003). By this same token, temporariness and the flexibility it brings hedges against the 
risk of “overembeddedness” (Uzzi, 1996). Overembeddedness can hurt organizations by 
making them vulnerable to environmental changes due to the limited diversity of information 
to which they have access (Zaheer et al., 2010). Moreover, because this type of generalized 
uncertainty is necessarily shared by a large group of organizations (although not necessarily 
all of them) there are quite likely many potential project partners around that equally want to 
flexibly engage in IOPVs to hedge risks across a larger group of organizations. Therefore, as 
is the case with firm-specific uncertainty, we expect market uncertainty to be positively 
related to IOPV participation by SMEs. 
Since market uncertainty is a relatively broad phenomenon, we follow Boyd (1990; 
Boyd et al., 1993), who proposed that environmental uncertainty can be specified into three 
key dimensions: munificence, dynamism, and complexity. Munificence indicates the 
abundance of resources in a firm’s environment. Low munificence (i.e. scarcity) means that 
there are relatively few resources in the environment. Munificence is, therefore, negatively 
related to market uncertainty meaning that higher levels of munificence (i.e. resource 
abundance) make for a less uncertain market (Boyd, 1990). Dynamism, or the level of 
instability in an environment, is an indicator of environmental volatility and is as such 
positively related to market uncertainty (Boyd et al., 1993). Complexity is a measure for 
inequalities among competitors, by looking at the number of firms in an industry, and their 
relative inequalities in market share. Market complexity has a curvilinear relation with 
uncertainty: both on a very highly concentrated market (with few and highly visible 
competitors that are easy to monitor) and on a market with low concentration (with perfect 
competition and firms with small market shares that cannot individually influence market 
outcomes), uncertainty is relatively low (Boyd, 1990). Uncertainty is high at moderate levels 
of complexity. 
We, therefore, expect: 
Hypothesis 5: SMEs embedded in industries with lower levels of munificence are  
more likely to participate in inter-organizational project ventures.  
Hypothesis 6: SMEs embedded in industries with higher levels of dynamism are more  
likely to participate in inter-organizational project ventures. 
Hypothesis 7: SMEs embedded in industries with moderate levels of complexity are  
more likely to participate in inter-organizational project ventures. 
 
 
Methods 
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Population and Sample 
We examined IOPV participation by SMEs by collecting primary data from a sample 
of 1,725 SMEs in the Netherlands, and by collecting longitudinal secondary data from the 
Dutch bureau of Statistics and the LISA-database, the latter of which contains information on 
the number of jobs and the type of economic activities for all establishments in the 
Netherlands (see Knoben and Weterings, 2010). 
The population of which firms could be drawn consisted of all SMEs in the 
Netherlands. Based on population information on the sectors and size classes of these firms, 
EIM maintains a panel of 2,000 organizations that is contacted yearly through a stratified 
random sample. In our case, the 2009 wave of data collection among the 2,000 SMEs in the 
sample yielded a response rate of 99% (N=1,987) which were successfully interviewed. This 
response is high for this type of research, and is a direct consequence of the telephone survey 
approach and the fact that many of the firms in the panel have a long history of working with 
EIM. Of the 1,987 organizations with which an interview was completed successfully, 1,725 
organizations completed all survey items. The drop from 1,987 to 1,725 organizations was 
mainly caused by organizations not answering the items on financial performance. A non-
response analysis demonstrated that this group was not significantly different from the group 
that did provide this information 
In addition to this, we had access to additional data from Statistics Netherlands and 
the LISA database, by which we for each of the major industries in the Dutch economy 
obtained longitudinal data on industry gross profits and employment to measure the industry 
variables we were interested in (munificence, dynamism, and complexity). 
=== Insert Table 1 about here === 
 
Dependent Variable 
 Inter-Organizational Project Venture Participation. We studied IOPV participation 
by enquiring in the telephone survey after whether, and if yes, how many, IOPVs a given 
SME was currently engaged in. In particular, our dependent variable was assessed by two 
measures: First, every participating SME was asked whether it currently engaged in IOPVs, 
defined as being temporary inter-organizational project ventures in which the participating 
firms had explicitly agreed ex ante that the duration of the collaboration would be limited 
(either by a date or the fulfilment of the project) and which was characterized by an 
interdependent execution of tasks with the other partners. Second, for those who did, we 
enquired after how many of such IOPVs they were currently engaged in. We combined these 
two variables into one count variable of IOPV participation, where the value indicated the 
number of IOPVs in which an SME engages (with 0 meaning that a particular firm is engaged 
in no inter-organizational project ventures).  
 
Independent Variables – Firm 
 Scope of Innovative Activities. The scope of the innovative activities of an SME was 
measured by summing the scores of three binary items for which respondents indicated 
whether their firm was engaged in 1) product and/or service innovation, 2) market 
innovation, and 3) process innovation. This resulted in a variable ranging between zero (no 
innovative scope) and three (broad innovative scope). As one cannot use Cronbach’s Alpha to 
assess the reliability of scales consisting of dummy variables, we looked at the correlations 
between the dummy’s (Spearman’s rho). This demonstrates that all of the items correlate to a 
sufficient extent for them to be summed into one measure (rho’s ranging between .364 and 
.716, all statistically significant at p < .01). 
Size of the Human Resources Base. The size of the human resource base was 
measured by the amount of employees on the SME’s payroll. Because this measurement 
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resulted in a distribution that was highly skewed it was log-transformed before utilization in 
our analyses. 
Efficiency of the Human Resource Base. The efficiency of the human resource base 
was measured by dividing an SME’s yearly firm sales by the number of employees on their 
payroll, which resulted in what is essentially a measure of earning capacity per employee. 
Both the sales and the number of employees were obtained for the year prior to the survey 
(2008). Because this measurement resulted in a distribution that was highly skewed it was 
log-transformed before utilization in our analyses. 
Perceived Firm-specific Uncertainty. To measure perceived firm-specific uncertainty, 
respondents were presented with five statements to which they were asked to reply on a three 
point scale ranging from “not applicable to my organization” to “highly applicable to my 
organization”. Moreover, one statement was presented to which the respondent was asked to 
reply on a five point Likert scale. We conducted an exploratory factor analysis on these six 
items to check whether they indeed represented the same latent factor. The results thereof, as 
well as the exact wording of the items are presented in Table 2. This table clearly shows that 
the six items all converge into a single underlying factor. Moreover, the reliability of the 
resulting scale is high (Cronbach’s alpha .85). Based on these results, a single variable was 
created out of the six aforementioned items. In this variable, the six items were weighed with 
their factor loadings and the resulting variable was standardized. 
=== Insert Table 2 about here === 
 
Independent Variables – Industry 
Our measures of market uncertainty are based on the framework proposed by Boyd 
(1990) who, in turn, based it on the work of Dess & Beard (1984). Following their work, we 
came to single score indicators of the three dimensions of market uncertainty, munificence, 
dynamism, and complexity. 
Munificence. As mentioned, munificence is a measure of the abundance of resources 
in the environment of a firm, where greater scarcity of resources, i.e. lower levels of 
munificence, implies greater uncertainty. Following Boyd (1990), munificence was measured 
for each industry as the regression-coefficient resulting from a regression analysis of time 
against industry gross-profits for the five years prior to the year of the survey (2003-2008) 
divided by the mean value of industry gross-profits over those five years. The required data 
were obtained from Statistics Netherlands. 
Dynamism. Dynamism is a measure of the volatility of the environment of an 
organization, where higher levels of volatility imply higher levels of uncertainty. Following 
Boyd (1990), dynamism was measured by the standard error of the coefficient resulting from 
a regression analysis of time against industry gross-profits for the five years prior to the year 
of the survey (2003-2008) divided by the mean value of industry gross-profits over those five 
years. The required data were obtained from Statistics Netherlands. 
Complexity. Two elements of the complexity of an industry are usually distinguished 
in the literature, namely the number of firms and their relative inequalities in market share 
(Boyd, 1990). The Herfindahl-index captures both of these elements in one measurement. 
This index is calculated by taking the sum of the squared market shares of each individual 
firm in an industry and, therefore, ranges between zero and one. A score of 1 represents a 
perfect monopoly and a value approaching zero represents perfect competition, the latter 
implying a higher level of complexity. A larger number of firms will push the value towards 
zero, whereas increasing inequalities in market share pushes it towards one. 
 
Control Variables 
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Besides these major variables of interest, we included the following variables as 
controls (no space to discuss argumentation or operationalization here, unfortunately!): 
entrepreneurial orientation (whether the main goal of their company was growth versus 
being independent and content with continuity), subsidiary status (whether the SME is a 
subsidiary of a larger firm), and legal form (i.e. whether there is a separation of ownership). 
 
Analyses 
We used a Zero Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) regression model to estimate the 
effects of the organizational and industry characteristics on inter-firm project venture 
participation. The choice for this model was informed by the distribution of the dependent 
variable, which is a count variable with a highly non-normal distribution that rules out 
conventional OLS regression models (Verbeek, 2004). With such count data, one is generally 
left with four alternative models that might fit the data: a Poisson regression model, a Zero 
Inflated Poisson (ZIP), a Negative Binomial regression (NBREG) or a Zero Inflated Negative 
Binomial regression (ZINB) (Long, 1997). Formal tests are available to choose the most 
appropriate model (see Long, 1997; Vuong, 1989). In STATA 10, we first ran the Poisson 
model and conducted a goodness-of-fit test which indicated that the assumption that the 
dependent variable followed a Poisson distributions was violated (Goodness-of-fit χ2 = 
4562.1, p < .001). This is likely due to the excess number of zeros in our dependent variable, 
which does not fit well with a Poisson distribution (Williamson et al., 2007). Therefore, we 
ran a ZIP regression model, and performed a Vuong test (Vuong, 1989) of the fit of the ZIP 
compared to the Poisson. The result of this test confirmed the ZIP over the Poisson (z= 14.00, 
p < .001).  
However, besides zero inflation, our dependent variable is also characterized by 
overdispersion (variance = 25.06; mean = 0.54), which is problematic for both the Poisson 
and the ZIP model (Hilbe, 2007). Therefore, we ran an NBREG model, and it indeed 
indicated overdispersion of our dependent variable (likelihood-ration test of alpha=0 was 
statistically significant, p < .001). The final step, then, was to compare the fit of a ZINB 
model, which simultaneously corrects for zero inflation and overdispersion, to both the ZIP 
and NBREG (Long, 1997). For our data, both the ZIP test comparing ZINB versus ZIP 
(likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0 was statistically significant, p < .001) and the Vuong test 
comparing the ZINB model versus the standard NBREG (z = 3.89, p < .001) indicated the 
ZINB regression model to be the best fit to our data.  
A potential source of bias in our analysis is the fact that some of our explanatory 
variables are measured at the industry rather than the firm level. As a result, error terms are 
likely to be correlated between firms within the same industry. In order to account for this 
possible correlation of errors within industries, we ran the ZINB regression model with 
clustered standard errors, which is an appropriate way to model this multi-level data structure 
(see Steenbergen & Jones, 2002). As we had expected, the fit of the ZINB model with 
clustered standard errors had a better fit to our data than the regular ZINB model (AIC = 
2219.2 for the ZINB with clustered standard errors, versus AIC = 2253.2 for the regular 
ZINB). 
Results 
Table 3 reports pooled descriptive statistics and correlations for our variables. Table 4 
presents the estimates of the Zero Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) regression model that 
tests our hypotheses. Model 1 provides baseline results for the control variables only. Model 
2 introduces the main hypothesized firm level factors of interest, and Model 3 the main 
industry factors. Model 4 is the full model with all variables of interest included. A feature of 
ZINB regression models is that they distinguish the dependent variable between two different 
ranges, an “inflate” part that determines the effects of the predictors on the likelihood of the 
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dependent variable not taking value 0 (so whether the dependent variable takes the value 0 or 
>0), and a second “number” part which simultaneously models the effects of the predictors 
on the dependent variable taking values 1 or higher (Winkelmann, 2008). In our application, 
this means that we essentially have two different models, modeling the effects of the 
predictors on the propensity of organizations to engage in IOPVs or not (i.e. the likelihood of 
the dependent variable taking a value >0 rather than 0) and a model for the number of IOPVs 
in their portfolio if and when they have at least one (i.e. the dependent variable taking a score 
of 1 or higher). For clarification, we will also refer to the former as “whether” an SME is 
likely to engage in an IOPV (i.e. 0 or >0), and to the latter as “how many” IOPVs they 
engage in (i.e. 1 – ∞). This distinction is essentially a feature of the ZINB regression model 
(Winkelmann, 2008), and therefore more germane to our analysis than it is to our initial 
theoretical framework. As we will elaborate below, however, our results started to suggest 
some interesting substantive differences between these two ranges of the dependent variable. 
As we discovered these differences only post-hoc, we will treat them as an interesting (and 
unexpected) outcome of our analyses. Therefore, we deliberately did not specify different a 
priori hypotheses for these two levels of the dependent variable before. 
Our analyses centered on two levels: the organizational level (H1 – H4) and the 
industry level (H5 – H7). With regard to the organizational antecedents of IOPVs, in keeping 
with hypothesis 1, Table 4 indicates that indeed the scope of innovative activities of an SME 
is positively and significantly related to both ranges of the dependent variable: whether an 
SME participates in IOPVs or not (p < .01), and also to the subsequent number of them in the 
portfolio (p < .001). Hypothesis 1, therefore, is clearly confirmed by our findings. The effect 
is more significant for the latter range of the dependent variable (i.e. for the number of IOPVs 
an SME engages in when it has at least one, i.e. y = 1 - ∞) than for the propensity for them to 
engage in IOPVs at all (i.e. y = 0 / >0) (Table 4). We found mixed results for the effect of the 
size of the human resource base on IOPV participation (Hypothesis 2). Although the 
coefficient for the effect on the propensity for SMEs to engage in IOPVs was in the 
hypothesized direction (the inflate coefficient being positive), it was only marginally 
significant (p < .10) (Table 4). Hypothesis 3 is partly confirmed. The coefficient for the effect 
of this variable on whether SMEs engage in an IOPV was not statistically significant. In 
hypothesis 4, we proposed that perceived firm-specific uncertainty would have a positive 
effect on IOPV participation. This hypothesis was rejected.  
 
=== Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here === 
  
Interestingly, this picture is entirely different for market uncertainty, which does have 
strong and statistically significant effects on IOPV participation. In hypothesis 5, specifically, 
we studied the effect of one dimension of market uncertainty, namely munificence, on project 
venture participation. In contrast to our expectations, we found this effect to be positively and 
significantly (p < .001) related to first range of the dependent variable, whether SMEs engage 
in IOPVs. Munificence appeared to be unrelated, however, to the subsequent number of 
IOPVs an SME has in its portfolio. In keeping with hypothesis 6, we found that dynamism 
positively and marginally significantly (p < .10) impacts the propensity of SMEs to 
participate in IOPVs. Contrasting our expectations, however, we also found that dynamism is 
negatively (p < .001) related to the subsequent number of IOPVs in a given SME’s portfolio. 
Dynamism thus positively impacts the propensity for SMEs to form an IOPV, but when it 
already has one negatively influences it forming more concurrent ones. For hypothesis 7 we 
found industry complexity to have an inverted U-shape effect on whether SMEs engage in 
IOPVs, with a positive and significant (p < .001) main effect, and a negative and significant 
(p < .05) effect of the squared term (plotting not shown here demonstrates a curvilinear 
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curve). For the effect of industry complexity on the subsequent number of IOPVs in the 
SMEs’ portfolio, we found a negative and significant main effect (p < .05). 
 
Robustness Tests 
 We estimated our regression models on random sub-samples in our data. Models 
based on cross-sectional data are sensitive to heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity issues, 
especially when they include interaction terms or squared terms. In order to minimize these 
problems, we estimated industry level clustered standard errors and mean standardized the 
variables for which the squared term is included in the analysis. Nevertheless, it has been 
argued that the estimated coefficients can still be sensitive to mutations in the underlying 
dataset (Echambadi & Hess, 2007). In order to assess this sensitivity for our data, we 
estimated the model on 10 randomly drawn sub-samples of our dataset (as suggested by 
Echambadi & Hess, 2007). Each sub-sample contained approximately 60% of the 
observations of the full dataset. For each of these 10 sub-samples we obtained results which 
were virtually identical to those reported in Table 4.As a second way to test the robustness of 
our findings, we recoded the dependent variable into a binary variable, and ran a more 
conventional logit regression model on our data. From this analysis with a dichotomized 
dependent variable we found a similar pattern of results (except of course for those variables 
that had non-uniform effects on the two ranges of the dependent variable, something a 
conventional logit regression model is unable to replicate).A third way in which we tested the 
robustness of our findings concerns the different possible operationalizations of the industry 
characteristics included in our regression model. To assess the robustness of our measures we 
compared them to 4 alternative procedures to compute them  (Keats & Hitt, 1988) This 
comparison revealed that the measures were extremely similar with correlations of 0.99 (p < 
.001) for munificence and 0.92 (p < .001) for dynamism and correlations between 0.92 and 
0.99, p < .001) for concentration. 
 
Discussion 
One of the broad, overarching interests of the present research was to start to attempt 
to bridge the fields of inter-firm relations and networks with that on temporary organizations 
and project management through a study of IOPVs. As mentioned, while IOPVs are perhaps 
most directly a specific kind of project (Söderlund, 2004), they are equally a specific kind of 
inter-firm collaboration (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008). Our findings regarding dynamism and 
complexity, amongst others, mirror and extend the results found in the research on alliances 
(Dickson & Weaver, 1997; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996), while our findings on the 
scope of innovative activities clearly link up with prior work on projects (Gann & Salter, 
2000; Hobday, 2000). While IOPVs thus seem to be sub-categories of inter-organizational 
relations on the one hand, and projects on the other, they are by their distinctive features 
different from both alliances (as a prime kind of inter-organizational collaboration) and in-
house projects (the most studied kind of projects). To the alliances literature, IOPVs, by 
virtue of their temporariness, contribute an explicit focus on the temporal dynamics involved 
in inter-firm collaboration. To the projects literature, IOPVs, by virtue of their multi-
partnerness, contribute an explicit focus on the inter-firm dynamics involved in project work. 
In the present article, we tried to draw upon crucial insights from both fields of literature in 
order to understand and explain IOPV participation. An overall interpretation of our main 
findings yields the following observations.  
A first notion concerns the overall effects of the firm and industry levels on IOPV 
participation. Both the regression model with only firm characteristics included (model 2 in 
Table 4) and that with just industry variables (model 3) have significantly more explanatory 
power than model 1 with just control variables, even when corrected for the number of 
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parameters to be estimated. In turn, judging from the AIC (2285 versus 2292), it seems that 
the firm level variables have slightly more explanatory power than the industry variables, but 
this difference is relatively small compared to the big drop occurring when both firm level 
and industry level variables are included simultaneously, with the AIC dropping to 2219. 
This is a clear indicator that rather than either/or, both the firm and industry level of analysis 
together have significant explanatory power for IOPV participation, and both should be 
included in our efforts to understand this important process. Rather than a quest for 
pinpointing which of the levels has most explanatory power (cf. Short et al., 2009), this 
finding builds on previous work which has concluded that both levels are important and 
should be included in our understanding of inter-organizational collaboration more generally 
(e.g. Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). 
A more specific area in which the differences between the level of the firm and the 
level of the industry do seem to materialize is uncertainty. Specifically, we found firm-
specific uncertainty (Hypothesis 4) to be largely unrelated to IOPV participation by SMEs, 
whereas the effects of the dimensions of market uncertainty (Hypothesis 5, 6, and 7) were 
strong predictors. This finding demonstrates the importance of the external environment 
(market uncertainty) for processes otherwise internal to project-based organizations (PBOs). 
This may be explained by the fact that temporary project relations in which partners and tasks 
get modified frequently, partner specific knowledge and memory systems are less important 
than in ongoing, stable networks, for which literature has found the opposite (Schwab & 
Miner, 2008; 2011). In projects, therefore, partners may more rely on stable industry 
variables rather than temporary firm specific factors. 
 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
First, while our analyses center on IOPV participation, the dynamics behind this 
process are not covered by our data. Nevertheless, it is a reality that the roles of different 
SMEs in an IOPV can be different, where one might be the instigator of a project and another 
SME plays a more peripheral role. Moreover, the composition of many IOPVs can be 
unstable, and organizations can leave, or later join, an IOPV during its existence (Duso et al., 
2010). Our data did not allow studying these dynamics behind IOPV participation and the 
different roles of the project partners in-depth, and future research would do well to include it 
in future analyses. 
A second limitation of the present study concerns the fact that we merely focused on 
IOPV participation by SMEs (i.e. not large firms). We did so because SMEs form a 
substantial part of the economy, and are often under-represented in large scale quantitative 
work. Moreover, IOPVs are key vehicles to achieve tasks too big or complex for SMEs to 
complete alone because of a lack of expertise or diseconomies of small scale, while helping 
them to stay adaptive and competitive by avoiding rigid, long term resource commitments 
(Nooteboom, 1994). Even so, we cannot assume that what we find here equally applies to 
IOPV participation by larger firms. Incidentally, the majority of work on projects has looked 
at the kinds of projects engaged in by large firms (see, for instance, Bredin & Söderlund, 
2007; Lindkvist et al., 1998). While our results clearly complement such work, we cannot on 
the basis of our data make claims stating which of our findings are also applicable to larger 
firms, for which, for instance, resources other than human resources might be more critical 
than for SMEs, and for which the dynamic between firm specific and market uncertainty 
might be entirely different. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
(Descriptive Tables 1 and 2 available from the author) 
 
TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlationsa 
Variable Mean s.d. Min. Max. VIF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Entrepreneurial Orientation .58 .49 .00 1.00 1.02          
2. Subsidiary Status .16 .37 .00 1.00 1.12 .00         
3. Legal Form .45 .50 .00 1.00 1.50 .12 .17        
4. Innovative Activities 1.04 1.03 .00 3.00 1.16 .02 .17 .24       
5. Size of Human Resource Baseb 1.89 1.36 .00 4.79 1.56 .11 .31 .50 .34      
6. Efficiency of Human Resource B.b 11.44 1.18 6.30 17.03 1.16 .08 .12 .31 .10 .19     
7. Perceived firm-specific uncertainty 1.13 1.00 .00 3.59 1.03 .03 .06 .13 .06 .10 .14    
8. Munificence 16.53 9.21 -.84 30.32 2.45 -.02 -.06 -.07 -.04 -.16 -.10 -.04   
9. Dynamism 2.95 1.70 .00 6.43 1.14 .00 -.05 -.06 -.10 -.13 .03 -.01 .26  
10. Complexity 4.89 6.31 .51 22.38 2.52 .03 .07 .17 .06 .12 .08 .04 -.76 -.31 
               
 
a n = 1725 organizations. Correlations greater than │.07│ are significant at p < .01. 
b Logarithm 
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TABLE 4  
Stepwise Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Regression Model of  
Inter-Firm Project Venture (IOPV) Participationab 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Whether SMEs engage in IOPVs (y = 0 / >0)c 
 
Entrepreneurial Orientation 0.34 (0.60) -0.44 (0.51) -0.16 (0.33) -0.24 (0.29) 
Subsidiary Status 12.93 (589.8) -0.16 (0.46) 1.34 (0.92) 0.27 (0.37) 
Legal Form 0.87 (0.70) 0.48 (0.60) 1.16 (0.81) 0.46 (0.68) 
Innovative Activities   0.17 (0.23)   0.35** (0.12) 
Size of HRBd   0.29* (0.14)   0.18† (0.11) 
Efficiency of HRB   -0.42 (0.32)   -0.12 (0.30) 
Perceived firm-sp. uncertainty   0.10 (0.19)   0.23 (0.15) 
Munificence     0.13* (0.06) 0.12*** (0.04) 
Dynamism     0.45† (0.26) 0.36† (0.20) 
Complexity     0.22* (0.11) 0.23*** (0.08) 
Complexity2     -0.01 (0.01) -0.01* (0.00) 
Constant  0.35 
 
(0.57) 
 
-4.09 
 
(4.63) 
 
3.41*** 
 
(0.76) 
 
2.81 
 
(3.88) 
 
Number of concurrent IOPVs (y= 1 - ∞) 
 
Entrepreneurial Orientation -0.65** (0.23) 0.02 (0.27) -0.31 (0.28) -0.10 (0.18) 
Subsidiary Status -0.60† (0.30) -0.08 (0.31) -0.59* (0.30) -0.34 (0.23) 
Legal Form 1.02*** (0.24) 0.12 (0.35) 0.44 (0.28) -0.14 (0.42) 
Innovative Activities   0.57** (0.17)   0.44*** (0.12) 
Size of HRB   -0.12 (0.10)   -0.03 (0.12) 
Efficiency of HRB   0.55*** (0.14)   0.42† (0.22) 
Perceived firm-sp. uncertainty   -0.02 (0.13)   -0.17 (0.15) 
Munificence     -0.03 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) 
Dynamism     -0.20** (0.07) -0.19*** (0.04) 
Complexity     0.02 (0.05) -0.07* (0.03) 
Complexity2     0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 
 
Constant 
 
.47† 
 
(0.28) 
 
-7.03*** 
 
(2.02) 
 
1.08 
 
(0.68) 
 
-3.92 
 
(3.23) 
         
Observations 1725  1725  1725  1725  
df 9  17  8  8  
Log-likelihood -1160.3  -1125.5  -1138.1  -1101.6  
AIC 
 
2338.6 
  
2285.1 
  
2292.1 
  
2219.2 
  
         
a Standard errors in parentheses 
b Models 3 and 4 introduce variation on the industry level, and are estimated with clustered standard errors 
c Recoded so that positive coefficients indicate a higher likelihood of inter-firm project venture participation, and negative 
values indicate a lower likelihood 
d HRB = Human Resource Base 
    † p < .10 
    * p < .05 
  ** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
 
